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The Federal Reserve’s AMLF program was designed to provide liquidity to money 
market funds (MMFs). Between September 2008 and May 2009, the program made $217 billion 
in non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies to purchase asset-
backed commercial paper from MMFs. JP Morgan and State Street dominated the program, 
accounting for over 90% of all loans made. Our analysis suggests that JP Morgan exhibited more 
self-dealing behavior than State Street. We find that JP Morgan and State Street earned 
economically and statistically significant cumulative returns of 2.28% and 2.49% (respectively) 
over the first seven days of the program after controlling for market returns and 
heteroscedasticity.  
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On September 19, 2008, following the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy of September 15, 
2008 and after a year of other programs designed to provide liquidity to the money markets, the 
Federal Reserve created the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF). This facility provided non-recourse loans to U.S. depositories and 
bank holding companies to finance their purchases of highly-rated asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) from qualified money market mutual funds (MMFs).  
       The program was designed to help MMFs that held ABCP to meet redemptions by 
investors and to promote liquidity in the ABCP market by providing a market for the assets as 
well as needed funds.   Duygan-Bump et al. (2012) find that AMLF was effective in its dual roles 
of (1) stabilizing MMF outflows and (2) improving ABCP market liquidity. Taking these global 
successes as our starting point, we examine which ABCP tended to be sold under AMLF and 
who benefited from the transactions using AMLF data from the Fed on 1,132 loans funding 
3,249 purchases of ABCP totaling more than $217 billion.  Seven financial institutions 
participated, with the top three, JP Morgan Chase (51.2%), State Street (41.1%), and Bank of 
New York Mellon (5.9%), accounting for over 98% of all loans by dollar volume.1  
The banks that participated in AMLF were administrators, liquidity providers, credit 
enhancement providers, or a combination of these three roles for many ABCP issues they 
purchased.2 By purchasing specific issues of ABCP using non-recourse loans from the Fed, these 
banks removed the need to honor guarantees on these issues and thus eliminated contingent cash 
 
1 Duygan-Bump et al (2012) indicated that there were 11 banks and bank holding companies involved.  In four 
cases, two different subsidiaries of the same financial holding company participated in the program – JP Morgan 
Chase Broker-Dealer and JP Morgan Chase Bank, State Street Bank &Trust Company and State Street Corp, Bank 
of New York Mellon and Bank of New York Mellon Broker-Dealer, Citibank and Citigroup Broker-Dealer. While 
we analyzed them both jointly and separately, we report and discuss the combined figures. 
2 Our analysis is based upon public records made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.  These data 
reflect a survivorship bias in that, for example, conduits set up by Bear Stearns, one of the leading securitizing firms 
(Kolb, 2011:209) are now listed under J.P. Morgan. 
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flow losses to third parties. Moreover, we find that several institutions actively repurchased 
ABCP for which they were a primary dealer.  For example, Bank of America (BofA), Citibank 
(Citi) and Credit Suisse were the dealers in 78%, 89%, and 58%, respectively, of the ABCP they 
purchased. Of the seven institutions that participated in AMLF, only State Street appeared to take 
a market-wide approach. 
The financial institutions participating in AMLF earned substantial profits. The two 
largest participants, JP Morgan and State Street made an estimated profit of $102 million on 
loans of $111.3 billion and $72.6 million on loans of $89.2 billion, respectively.3 JP Morgan and 
State Street also earned returns of 2.28% and 2.49%, respectively, over the first seven days of the 
AMLF program.4   
We conclude that, while AMLF supplied money market funds with much needed 
liquidity to avoid “breaking the buck,” the program also provided banks with risk-free profits, 
the ability to avoid possible contingent cash flow losses, and the opportunity to engage in self-
dealing. The program also involved no competitive bidding for funds by institutions and did not 
address the concentration issue (i.e., the potential for two institutions to dominate the facility).  
2. Background 
2.1. Asset-backed commercial paper 
Commercial paper (CP) is short-term debt of private corporations with maturities of 
between one and 270 days.5  Throughout the 2000s, there were between 1,000 and 2,000 issuers 
with a total outstanding volume in excess of $1 trillion.  CP issuers are generally large firms of 
 
3The Federal Reserve collected an estimated $550 million of interest on loans of $217 billion over the 09/2008-
08/2009 period. 
4 However, there may be a confounding factor in that on September 20, 2008, the day after the AMLF was 
announced, the Treasury Department submitted draft legislation to Congress for authority to purchase troubled 
assets. 
5 See Covitz and Downing (2007) for a review of institutional details of the market for commercial paper. 
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high credit quality: more than 95% of issuers are in the top two CP rating categories, A1/P1 and 
A2/P2.6 Some issuers have in-house departments that issue CP, while others place their paper 
through dealers, dubbed directly- and dealer-placed paper, respectively. Issuing CP is usually 
cheaper than taking out short-term bank loans because the intermediary is bypassed.7  
Three distinct categories of CP are financial CP issued by financial institutions (primarily 
finance companies and bank-holding companies), non-financial CP issued by manufacturing and 
retail companies, and asset-backed CP (ABCP). Historically, commercial paper has been 
unsecured, i.e., backed only by a firm’s ability to generate cash flows. With the advent of 
securitization, portfolios of various types of loans could be sold into the capital markets and have 
become a significant part of the market. An institution wishing to participate in the ABCP market 
sells its assets to an off-balance sheet bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV) or 
structured investment vehicle (SIV). The financial assets serving as collateral may be accounts 
receivable or a mix of many different assets (including or limited to subprime mortgages) which 
are jointly judged to have a low risk of bankruptcy by a recognized ratings agency. Many of 
these ABCP conduits exhibited a significant duration mismatch between assets and liabilities as 
they held medium- to long-term assets funded by issuing short-term commercial paper. Acharya 
et al. (2010) report that sponsors of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) provided four different 
types of guarantees, all of which reduced bank capital requirements and provided different levels 
 
6 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm. 
7 However, non-financial CP issues (about 10%-15% of the CP market) are usually backed by bank lines of credit, 
which cover rollover risk but not necessarily default risk. Issuers frequently roll over CP instead of retiring it by 
having the new CP repay the maturing CP and thus, on occasion, creating a timing problem.  The back-up lines of 
credit exist to eliminate rollover risk by providing immediate access to liquidity when such timing problems occur. 
However, a bank can refuse to extend a loan in the case of a material adverse change in the borrower’s financial 
condition; this clause may be invoked in instances where the issuer’s credit rating may have changed or is changing. 
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of insurance to outside investors.8 Brunnermeier (2009:80) points out that there also existed an 
opportunity for regulatory and ratings arbitrage: 
“The Basel I accord (an international agreement that sets guidelines for bank regulation) 
required that banks hold at least 8 percent of the loans on their balance sheets; this 
capital requirement. . .was much lower for contractual credit lines.  Moreover, there was 
no capital charge at all for “reputational” credit lines – noncontractual liquidity 
backstops that sponsoring banks provided to structured investment vehicles… Thus, 
moving a pool of loans into off-balance-sheet vehicles, and then granting a credit line to 
that pool to ensure a AAA-rating, allowed banks to reduce the amount of capital they 
needed to hold. . . while the risk for the bank remained essentially unchanged.” 
 
 In 2007-2008, many of the assets serving as collateral for ABCP performed more poorly 
than expected making investors much less willing to purchase ABCP. As markets became less 
willing to purchase ABCP, cash flow concerns arose for financial institutions relying on conduits 
to roll over their ABCP to obtain funds for use in longer-term investments. Mismatching the 
durations of assets and liabilities had been profitable when ABCP was considered safe and 
ABCP investors were willing to accept low interest rates, but forced SIVs to quickly liquidate 
their longer-term investments, sometimes at substantial losses, when they were no longer able to 
sell ABCP.9 As Adrian and Shin (2008) point out, bank leverage is pro-cyclical: increases in 
securities’ prices lead to purchases of additional (often risky) securities and increases in leverage, 
while decreases in securities’ prices lead to sales of securities and decreases in leverage.  When 
securities prices go up, the upward adjustment of leverage entails even larger purchases of 
securities than that for the case of constant leverage.  The adjustment of leverage and price 
 
8 Acharya et al. (2010) find only 2.5% of ABCP outstanding as of July 2007 entered default in the period from 
7/2007-12/2008. The results of their analyses suggest: [1] all outside investors covered by liquidity guarantees were 
repaid in full, [2] investors in conduits with weak guarantees suffered small losses and [3] losses from the SPVs 
remained with the banks rather than outside investors.  As the guarantees were called to make the outside investors 
whole, the losses were taken on the banks’ balance sheets and massive deleveraging took place with the ensuing 
downward pressure on asset prices.  Acharya et al. (2010) estimate that with a loss rate of 5% to 15%, commercial 
banks suffered losses of $68 billion to $204 billion on conduit assets. 
9 Adrian and Shin (2010:6) report that, “(f)or an off-balance sheet vehicle such as a SIV . . . that finances holdings 
of mortgage assets by issuing commercial paper, a difference of a quarter or half percent in the funding cost may 
make all the difference between a profitable venture and a loss-making one.” 
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changes reinforce each other in an amplification of the financial cycle, making negative shocks 
to security prices potentially catastrophic to the highly leveraged institutions. The collapse of the 
sub-prime mortgage market due to an inability to value the underlying assets was such a negative 
shock.10 
Figure 1 plots outstanding CP amounts in all maturities of total, non-financial, financial, 
and asset-backed CP, and provides a number of important insights. The CP market peaked at 
about $2.2 trillion outstanding just prior to the BNP announcement in August 2007, then 
declined steadily to a little over $1 trillion. The vast majority of the contraction occurred in 
ABCP which peaked at $1.2 trillion in June of 2007, making it the largest money market 
instrument in the United States at the time, and declined to about $400 billion by September 
2010. Financial CP peaked at about $800 billion before the Lehman bankruptcy only to decline 
to about $500 billion as lenders became concerned about the stability of the entire financial 
system.  These declines returned the amounts outstanding in these segments of the CP market to 
the pre-housing bubble levels.    
 
2.2. Money market funds 
 
Money market funds (MMFs) invest in short-term debt of governments and private 
companies. In the U.S., MMFs developed in the 1970s as an alternative to bank deposits in the 
era of capped deposit interest rates. Rule 2a-7 (Rule) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
guides the investment activities of MMFs. Under the Rule, a money fund must mainly invest in 
the highest rated debt maturing in less than 13 months. During our study period (2008-2009), the 
 
10 The event most often identified (Taylor and Williams (2009)) as the beginning of the financial crisis is the August 
9, 2007 announcement by BNP Paribas that it had temporarily halted redemptions from three of its funds. Quoting 
the BNP press release on that day, “(t)he complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the U.S. 
securitization market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or credit 
rating.” A timeline of the financial crisis developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis lists 10 items prior to 




portfolio must have maintained a weighted average maturity of 90 days or less and must not have 
invested more than 5% in any one issuer (1% in a “second-tier,” i.e., not highest-rated, issuer), 
except for government securities and repurchase agreements.11, 12  
Almost all MMFs use the amortized cost method, under which securities are valued at 
acquisition cost rather than market value; interest earned (plus any discount received or less any 
premium paid upon purchase) is accrued uniformly over the remaining maturity. By declaring 
these accruals as a daily dividend to its shareholders, the fund is able to maintain a stable price of 
$1 per share. For the price to fall below $1 (“breaking the buck”), some of the securities in the 
fund must either suffer default or be liquidated at below the amortized cost. In the latter case, the 
amount of redemptions by fund shareholders must be significant.  
While the U.S. CP market has been around since the 19th century, after MMFs were 
introduced in the U.S. in the 1970s, MMFs and the CP market have developed hand in hand: 
MMFs bought CP in search of superior returns on relatively safe assets, and firms were in turn 
encouraged to issue CP because MMFs were willing to buy it. MMFs held about 40% of 
outstanding CP between 1990 and 2008.13 After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 
15, 2008, a large institutional money market fund, Reserve Primary, broke the buck due to its 
holdings of $785 million of the Lehman-issued debt. Its price per share subsequently fell to 
$0.971. This was only the second occurrence of breaking the buck in the 35-year history of the 
money market fund industry.14 The event led to a panic among institutional money fund 
 
11 These rules became more stringent after the crisis. The changes to Rule 2a-7 are outlined in SEC Press Release 
2010-14 made on January 27, 2010 (accessible at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-14.htm).  
12 Brennan et al (2009) report that money market mutual funds managed 24 percent of US business short-term assets 
in 2006. 
13 See, Anderson, and Gascon (2009:596). 
14 Ironically, Reserve Primary was the first MMF offered to investors in the U.S. in 1971. Putnam Investments 
closed and liquidated the Putnam Prime Money Market Fund after the Lehman’s bankruptcy due to large 
redemptions by investors, even though the fund did not hold paper issued by any failed institutions. The first case of 
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investors, who started making large withdrawals, causing the funds to liquidate some assets 
quickly.  
While all money market securities are fairly liquid, CP is one of the least liquid classes of 
securities held by MMFs and the one generally considered riskiest by investors, especially after 
the Lehman’s fall. Consequently, MMFs started avoiding CP, especially asset-backed, financial, 
and lower-rated non-financial issues, and switched to safe havens such as U.S. T-bills, driving 
the demand for CP down and yields up.  To address this problem in a rapidly changing market, 
the Fed quickly implemented AMLF. 
 
2.3. The AMLF  
On September 19, 2008, after working closely with State Street in setting up the program, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston instituted the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF).15 The AMLF was designed to help restore 
liquidity in the ABCP market and assist registered money market mutual funds in maintaining 
adequate liquidity to meet investor redemption demand. Initially, all MMFs registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission under Rule 2a-7 with eligible ABCP were permitted to 
participate in AMLF.  Hence, there were initially no liquidity restrictions on MMFs with respect 
to the amount of ABCP that could be sold to the AMLF as long as the requisite eligibility and 
rating requirements were met.16  
 
a money market fund breaking the buck occurred in 1994, when Community Bankers U.S. Government Money 
Market Fund was liquidated at 94 cents because of large losses in derivatives. 
15 This subsection is based on the AMLF FAQ, accessible at http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/mmmf.cfm.  
16 On June 25, 2009 the Fed amended the rules to ensure that liquidity support and not credit risk support was being 
provided to the MMFs.  To be eligible for the revised program, MMFs must have experienced net redemptions 
exceeding 5% of net assets in a single day or 10% over a period of five business days or less. A fund would become 
eligible on the day after the threshold was met and remain eligible for five business days.  There were no 
transactions after May 8, 2009 under the AMLF program; hence, all AMLF transactions took place under the initial 
rules of the program. 
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The facility, which extended a total of $217 billion in loans, was authorized by federal 
regulations which permit the Federal Reserve, in unusual circumstances, to authorize Reserve 
Banks to extend credit to certain parties that are unable to obtain adequate credit 
accommodations. The AMLF, which was originally intended to expire on January 30, 2009 but 
was extended several times and eventually closed on February 1, 2010, allowed depository 
institutions and bank holding companies to borrow funds from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston discount window to fund purchases of qualifying ABCP from eligible MMFs or other 
eligible entities under certain conditions. Loans under the facility were extended on a non-
recourse basis at a fixed rate equal to the primary credit rate in effect at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston at the time of the borrowing.17 The term of the loan equaled the maturity of the 
ABCP collateralizing it. Further, the loans were made without a “haircut,” i.e., the loans were for 
the full value of collateral – an unusual design necessitated by the weakened net asset values of 
the MMFs and the concomitant inability to charge a penalty rate for using the facility.  A single 
loan could be used to buy several ABCP issues from the same or different MMFs as long as all 
the ABCP had the same remaining maturity. ABCP was purchased at the fund’s amortized cost, 
i.e., the acquisition cost adjusted for accretion of the discount. Only asset-backed debt issued by 
U.S.-based borrowers with maturities of 120 days or less for bank holding companies and 270 
days or less for depository institutions was eligible for the program. The securities were required 
to carry a rating of at least A1, P1 or F1, the highest ratings for short-term debt and without a 
‘negative watch’ designation. Due to non-recourse nature of the loans, in the case of ABCP 
default, the portion of the loan collateralized by the defaulted ABCP was not to be repaid by the 
 
17 The primary credit rate during the life of AMLF was 25 basis points above the target federal funds rate (above 
0.25% when the target rate was specified as a range from 0 to 0.25% starting on December 16, 2008). 
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borrower to the FRB of Boston, and no interest would be charged on this portion of the loan. 
None of the debt purchased under the program suffered any losses. 
 
2.4. Other programs established during the fall of 2008  
 To put the analysis of the AMLF and assess its role in a larger context, we provide here 
the relevant background on three other programs established in the fall of 2008 to stabilize the 
U.S. money markets in the order in which they were introduced: TGP for MMFs, MMIFF, and 
CPFF. 
 The Treasury’s Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (TGP for 
MMFs) was announced on September 19, 2008 (the same day as the AMLF) and officially 
opened on September 29, 2008. Under this program, the Treasury effectively insured 
participating MMFs from “breaking the buck” (i.e., a fund's NAV falling below $0.995 per 
share). Quoting the Treasury’s press release, the TGP for MMFs was designed “(t)o address 
temporary dislocations in credit markets”.18 The program was initially announced for a three-
month period and later extended through September 18, 2009. By the end of the enrollment 
period on October 10, 2008, the Treasury collected $337.8 million in fees for the initial three-
month period, covering $3.62 trillion of MMF assets, or 93 percent of the MMF market.19, 20 At 
the program’s expiration in September 2009, utilization had declined to 68 percent of the market. 
The Treasury experienced no losses under the program and earned $1.2 billion in fees. The 
program may have helped stop the wave of withdrawals institutional MMFs suffered in the first 
 
18 Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, September 29, 2008; accessed on 
August 31, 2012 at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx.  
19 See the 2008 and 2009 U.S. Treasury Annual Reports, 
20 MMFs with a per-share NAV of $0.9975 or greater as of September 19, 2008 paid a fee (an insurance premium) 
of 0.01 percent (one basis point) of total net assets, while MMFs with a per-share NAV between $0.995 and $0.9975 
paid 0.015 percent (1.5 basis points) of total net assets for a three-month guarantee. Funds with a per-share NAV 
below $0.995 on September 19, 2008 (i.e., those who already “broke the buck”) were not eligible for the program. 
As mentioned earlier, there was only one such fund, the Reserve Primary Fund.  
10 
 
few days after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and the Reserve Primary fund broke the 
buck. 
The Federal Reserve’s Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) was 
announced on October 21, 2008 to provide liquidity to MMFs to increase their ability to meet 
redemptions and their willingness to invest in term (i.e., longer than overnight) money market 
instruments. The Fed stated that MMIFF was a complement to the AMLF and was designed to 
serve a similar purpose – increasing the liquidity available to MMFs. This facility can be viewed 
as a discount window for MMFs. It was closed on October 30, 2009. While no loans were made 
under this program, having it in place may have helped (along with the TGP for MMFs), to 
prevent additional waves of redemptions. 
While these two programs may have been beneficial in stopping redemptions, MMFs 
were still reluctant to purchase commercial paper, including ABCP. In response, the Federal 
Reserve established the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) which was announced on 
October 7, 2008 and started operating on October 27, 2008 with the stated goal to provide a 
liquidity backstop to CP issuers. The CPFF purchased only highest-rated (A1/P1) unsecured 90-
day CP and eligible 90-day ABCP from issuers at the yield equal to the overnight index swap 
(OIS) rate plus 200 bps for unsecured CP and at the rate of OIS plus 300 bps for ABCP.  
At the time of the initial registration, each issuer paid a facility fee of 10 bps of the 
maximum amount of CP that it could issue to the CPFF. The Fed collected $849 million in fees 
and earned about $5.25 billion in interest throughout the life of the program (which was closed 
on February 1, 2010, with the last CP holdings maturing on April 26, 2010), and no losses were 
experienced. Several studies suggest that the CPFF helped stabilize the commercial paper market 
– issuance increased (yields decreased) after the decline (increase) that occurred after the 
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Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (e.g., Anderson and Gascon (2009), Duca (2012), and Griffiths, 
Kotomin and Winters (2011)).21 We provide a comparison of CPFF and AMLF in section 5. 
 
3.  Data and summary statistics of the AMLF program 
Between September 22, 2008 and May 8, 2009, the AMLF made 1,132 loans to seven 
financial institutions to finance purchases of 3,249 issues of ABCP from 191 MMFs, issued by 
91 different ABCP programs.22  
Table 1 provides a list of days during the program on which loans were made and ABCP 
was purchased from MMFs with details on the loans made and the ABCP sold on each day.  The 
loans made under the AMLF program totaled $217.26 billion. Almost three quarters of all loans 
by dollar volume ($159.06 billion, or 73.21%) were made between September 22 and September 
30, 2008 (the end of the third quarter). This is not surprising for several reasons. First, the 
Treasury Department announced on September 19, 2008 that it would insure MMFs from 
breaking the buck, which stopped the wave of withdrawals from MMFs.  Second, the funds that 
initially sold ABCP holdings to the AMLF borrowers may have abstained from future 
investments in ABCP at least temporarily, may have reduced such investments, or may have 
switched to the shortest maturities of ABCP.23 Third, quarter-ends tend to be the periods of 
heightened liquidity needs (Ogden 1987, Griffiths and Winters 1997, 2005). Finally, after 
 
21 There was also the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), announced on October 14, 2008, 
which had two components: One that guaranteed newly-issued senior unsecured debt of insured depository 
institutions and most U.S. holding companies (the Debt Guarantee Program) and another that guaranteed certain 
noninterest-bearing transaction accounts at insured depository institutions (the Transaction Account Guarantee 
Program). ABCP, being secured debt, did not qualify for the Debt Guarantee Program. The instruments guaranteed 
by the TGLP were dominated by financial commercial paper (not asset-backed) and medium-term notes. 
22 The original file provided by the Fed (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/amlf.xls) comprises 1,133 
loans to finance purchases of 3,257 ABCPs. We eliminated 8 ABCP purchases (all financed by the same loan) for 
which ABCP sold did not qualify for AMLF.  The largest loan was for $2,614.1M and involved 29 CP issues (the 
largest number of issues financed by one loan); the smallest loan was for $0.248M.  Duygan-Bump et al. (2012) 
restrict their analysis to 105 prime MMMFs, which represent 42 percent of AMLF-eligible individual prime funds.  
23 A large increase in issuance of shortest-term ABCP after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy is consistent with this 
conjecture. We discuss this point later in the paper.  
12 
 
October 27, 2008 many ABCP issuers were able to sell their commercial paper directly to the 
Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which we discuss later in the paper.  The size 
of the AMLF peaked at $152 billion (21.92% of ABCP outstanding at the time) in its second 
week. While the facility was officially closed on February 1, 2010, the last loan was made on 
May 8, 2009 (maturing in August 2009). Outside of the September 22 through September 30, 
2008 window, May 5, 2009 experienced the largest loan volume, $23.15 billion, or 10.7% of all 
AMLF loans.24   
Table 2 provides the list of financial institutions taking loans under the AMLF to 
purchase ABCP.  The list shows that seven financial institutions participated in the program with 
the top three – JP Morgan Chase (51.2%), State Street (41.1%), and Bank of New York Mellon 
(5.9%) – accounting for over 98% of all loans. Table 2 also reports estimated profits which run 
approximately 10 basis points on the total amount of ABCP purchased.  For example, JP Morgan 
made an estimated profit of $102 million on loans of $111 billion with an average maturity of 51 
days.25 Stigum (1990) notes that 10 basis points is an attractive opportunity in money markets. 
However, ex ante, these profits were not guaranteed (the guarantee was against losses) and at the 
time, concern centered on the ability to identify toxic assets. We believe that our analysis 
answers the question of why these particular institutions chose to participate in AMLF.   
Table 3 identifies the MMFs that sold the largest amounts of ABCP via the AMLF. The 
top 13 sellers, each of which sold over 2% of the total ABCP into the AMLF, accounted for 
 
24 The most likely reason for the sharp increases in sales of ABCP to the AMLF by MMFs is the rule change 
announced by the Fed on May 4, 2009 that MMFs must experience net redemptions exceeding 5% of net assets in a 
single day or 10% over a period of five business days or less to be eligible to sell paper to the AMLF. The rule 
became effective on June 25, 2009. 
25 The profits are estimated as total par value of ABCP purchased less total amortized cost of ABCP purchased less 
total interest paid to the Fed.  
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approximately 50% of the total CP sold. These 13 MMFs sold a total of $109.4 billion of ABCP, 
which represented between 15% and 20% of the total ABCP market at the time.   
One of the intentions of the AMLF was to limit sales of ABCP at fire-sale prices and to 
provide the ABCP market (which had already experienced a substantial contraction) an orderly 
sale/liquidation method generating both liquidity and price support for the market.  Our 
preliminary analysis, which lends prima facie support to this claim, indicates that the program 
clustered not only in time but also in both the financial institutions and MMFs participating 
instead of being a broad-based market solution.   
 
 
4. Analysis of AMLF transactions 
4.1. MMFs, fund families, and JP Morgan and State Street participation 
As shown in Table 2, 92.3% of the AMLF loans went through JP Morgan and State 
Street.  To examine how JP Morgan and State Street participated in the program, we identify 
every MMF that sold $1 billion or more into the AMLF.  Table 4 includes, in addition to every 
$1 billion participant, all other fund family members that participated in the AMLF.  For each 
participating MMF, we provide the financial institutions that purchased the ABCP sold and 
identify the funds’ custodian.    
 Panel A of Table 4 lists the MMFs where both JP Morgan and State Street participated in 
purchases of ABCP.  These purchases cover 1,283 transactions (39.5% of the total transactions) 
for approximately $104.1 billion (47.9% of the total dollar value).  JP Morgan participated in 588 
purchases which represents 31.2% of their transactions under AMLF.  State Street participated in 
687 purchases in this set of transactions or 59.8% of their total transactions under AMLF.   
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 Panel B of Table 4 lists the MMFs where either JP Morgan or State Street participated in 
purchases of ABCP, but not both. These purchases cover 1,509 transactions (46.4% of the total 
transactions) for $102.4 billion (47.2% of the total dollar value).  JP Morgan participated in 
1,009 purchases representing 53.6% of their transactions under AMLF.  State Street participated 
in 340 purchases, or 29.6% of their AMLF transactions.  We note that JP Morgan’s MMFs are in 
this group and that JP Morgan handled all purchases from them.  Also, Dreyfus has participation 
from JP Morgan and not State Street, but the majority of ABCP it sold was purchased by 
BNY/Mellon.  Dreyfus is a subsidiary of BNY/Mellon.   
Comparing Panels A and B from Table 4 provides two insights.  First, MMF families 
with at least one fund selling in excess of $1 billion are equally likely to do split deals between 
JP Morgan and State Street versus stand-alone deals.  Second, State Street is more likely to 
participate in split deals while JP Morgan is more likely to go alone, although State Street did not 
participate as actively after October 2008.  The majority of JP Morgan’s deals after October 2008 
are with MMFs with which they did deals at the outset of AMLF (September and October of 
2008). 
We also identify the custodians for the MMFs selling ABCP into the AMLF program.  A 
custodian holds and safeguards the securities owned by a mutual fund. Panel A of Table 4 
contains 10 MMF families, and State Street is the custodian for nine of them.  Barclays is the 
only fund family exception in this group.  Panel B contains 15 MMF families, five of which sold 
ABCP to State Street under the AMLF, and four of the five use State Street as their custodian.  
Dreyfus sold the majority of their ABCP to BNY/Mellon, with the remainder sold to JP Morgan.  
BNY/Mellon is the custodian for Dreyfus.  The other nine of the 15 MMF families sold ABCP to 
JP Morgan.  Both the JP Morgan and Fidelity MMF families use JP Morgan as their custodian.  
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The remaining six MMF families that sold exclusively to JP Morgan use a variety of custodians 
including State Street but not JP Morgan.  
Table 4 contains data on ABCP sales from 25 different MMF families.  State Street 
participated in 15 of the 25 families, and for 13 of these 15 families it was the custodian holding 
the ABCP.  State Street did not participate in purchasing ABCP from ten of the MMF families; 
for nine of these ten families, JP Morgan handled the vast majority of the purchases but was the 
custodian in only three cases.   
 
4.2. AMLF financial institutions and their relation with ABCP programs 
There are 91 ABCP programs in our sample.26   In this section, we report the relations 
between these programs and the seven AMLF financial institutions, with the focus on JP Morgan 
and State Street. 
Table 5 lists the seven financial institutions participating in the AMLF program and 
whether a given financial institution has a relation with the underlying ABCP program, with a 
relation defined as being: (1) an administrator, (2) a liquidity provider, (3) a credit enhancer, or 
(4) some combination of the three.27  JP Morgan has such relations for about 11% of the ABCP it 
purchased, while State Street has relations for approximately 5.5% of the ABCP it purchased.  
Interestingly, BofA (63%), Citi (46%), and Suntrust (73%) have relations with the ABCP 
programs for a significant portion of the ABCP they purchased.  BNY/Mellon (0.5%) and Credit 
Suisse (0.0%) have virtually no role as administrator, liquidity provider or credit enhancer with 
the ABCP they purchased.  However, BNY/Mellon purchased ABCP almost exclusively from 
MMFs of a subsidiary (Fidelity), and Credit Suisse purchased ABCP exclusively from its own 
 
26 The list of the 91 programs is available upon request. 




MMFs. These results suggest that the five “small” players in AMLF participated in the program 
for self-interest possibly related to the previously mentioned issues dealing with contingent cash 
flows.  Of the two big players, JP Morgan appears to show more self-interest than State Street. 
Commercial paper is sold either directly to investors or placed with investors through 
dealers.  Dealers that place commercial paper stand ready to buy it back, thus creating a 
secondary market.  All of the financial institutions that participated in AMLF have the ability to 
serve as dealers in the commercial paper market.  Accordingly, we now examine whether the 
institutions were dealers in the ABCP they purchased under AMLF.   
We identify the dealers for 86 of the 91 programs, representing 95.7% (94.2%) of the par 
value (number of ABCP issues) purchased through the facility. It is common that a financial 
institution having a role as an administrator, liquidity provider, or credit enhancement provider 
also acts as a dealer and market-maker for the conduit. Most ABCP programs have multiple 
dealers. The mean (median) number of dealers in our sample is 4.57 (4.00). Only the 
BNY/Mellon and Suntrust are not ABCP dealers.   
Table 6 has the dealers in columns and borrowers in rows, so BNY/Mellon and Suntrust 
do not have columns; the first cell of the table shows that BofA was a dealer for 31.81% of the 
ABCP purchased through AMLF by JP Morgan.  The BofA column shows that BofA was a 
dealer in 78.21% of the ABCP it purchased.     
Examining Table 6 in detail shows that BofA, Citi and Credit Suisse are dealers in 78%, 
89%, and 58% (respectively) of the ABCP they purchase.  This supports the contention that the 
small players in AMLF are self-dealing.  That is, their transactions were designed to address 
internal commitments and obligations rather than market issues. Similarly, JP Morgan is a dealer 
in 56% of the ABCP it purchased, whereas it is one of the dealers for 63% of the ABCP 
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purchased by State Street. Conversely, although State Street is listed as a dealer for ABCP 
programs, it was not an active dealer for any of the programs involved in the AMLF facility.  
Accordingly, between the two big players JP Morgan continues to exhibit more self-dealing than 
State Street.  Finally, the data in Table 6 indicate that the financial institutions participating in the 
AMLF that are also dealers in ABCP used the program to assist their market maker role in the 
commercial paper market, consistent with the Fed’s stated objective of providing liquidity to this 
market. 
 
4.3. Assets held by ABCP conduits 
In this section, we examine whether JP Morgan or State Street had any systematic 
preference in the type or quality of assets they acquired. We have the portfolio asset composition 
for 64 of the 91 ABCP programs in our sample, which accounts for 83.15% (83.96%) of the par 
value (number of ABCP issues) sold through the facility. Table 7 reports asset ratings and Table 
8 reports the three largest asset classes held by the ABCP conduits sold through the AMLF.  
Tables 7 and 8 report information by MMF family name using the same 25 families from Table 4 
that have at least one MMF that sold $1 billion or more of ABCP under the program.  Panel A of 
each table provides information for the deals split between JP Morgan and State Street, and Panel 
B reports information for the deals that are not split. 
A significant portion of the assets held by ABCP conduits are classified as either (1) not 
rated or (2) securities. We report the percentage of holdings in both categories, along with the 
three rating categories with the largest weight in the portfolio in Table 7.28 The conduit assets 
composition in Table 7 can be divided into three groups: (1) 15% securities or less, (2) more than 
 
28 Note, the rated weights are small because they are a percentage of the entire portfolio which includes large 
percentages of non-rated assets and securities. 
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15% securities, and (3) the Reserve Primary Fund.  The Reserve Primary Fund is important 
because its ‘breaking the buck’ was one of the significant events during the financial crisis and 
thus provides a useful benchmark.  The Reserve Primary Fund held ABCP with a portfolio 
composition of 55% securities and only 8% non-rated assets.  Our data do not provide additional 
details on the securities held by the ABCP conduits. However, multiple sources [e.g., Duygan-
Bump et al (2012), Brunnermeier (2009)]suggest that the instruments held in the ABCP 
conduits’ securities category typically include rated asset-backed, mortgage-backed, and 
corporate securities. Approximately 21% of the conduit’s assets were rated Aa2.  Comparing the 
Reserve Primary Fund to the other fund families suggests that the Reserve Primary Fund focused 
more on rated securities and in particular highly-rated securities than any other participant in 
AMLF.   
We also note the lack of quality in the ratings reported in Table 7.  Historically, only 
businesses with short-term ratings of P1 or P2 were able to issue commercial paper, with the 
bottom of the P2 category equivalent to a Baa bond rating.  The small amounts of holdings of 
Baa and higher rated securities along with the large amount of non-rated assets suggest that the 
ABCP conduits held much riskier assets than the traditional issuers of commercial paper.   This 
is consistent with the findings reported by Duygan-Bump et al (2012). 
In Panel A of Table 7 and setting aside the Reserve Primary Fund, we have five split 
deals with less than 15% securities and four split deals with more the 15% securities.  This 
suggests that in split deals JP Morgan and State Street are indifferent to the amount of securities 
held in the ABCP conduit. Panel B of Table 7 provides the asset classes of the ABCP conduits 
where JP Morgan and State Street did not split deals.  Recall that in the case of Dreyfus, JP 
Morgan participated without State Street but the majority of the deals went through BNY/Mellon 
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(see Table 4). State Street has five stand-alone deals, in all of which it remained indifferent to the 
amount of securities held by the ABCP conduit, as two deals have less than 15% securities and 
three deals have more.  Alternatively, when JP Morgan deals alone, it prefers deals with 15% or 
less securities.  Specifically, JP Morgan went alone with eight fund families, and the only family 
where the level of securities in the ABCP conduit exceeded 15% involved its own MMFs. 
Table 8 provides the three largest classes of assets in the portfolio of the ABCP conduits 
from the MMF families with at least one MMF selling $1 billion or more of ABCP.  In Panel A, 
five of the ten families sold ABCP with securities being the largest underlying asset class. Panel 
B suggests that State Street did not shy away from ABCP with securities as a primary underlying 
asset.  In fact, securities are among the three largest underlying asset classes in four of the five 
stand-alone deals.  Setting Dreyfus aside because of its association with BNY/Mellon, Panel B 
suggests that JP Morgan was more reluctant to do stand-alone deals where securities were a main 
underlying asset, except in the case of their own funds.  In the seven solo deals not involving 
their own MMFs, JP Morgan did two deals where securities were among the top three asset 
classes and in both cases, securities were only the third largest asset class.  Instead, JP Morgan 
focused on deals where the assets in the ABCP conduit were primarily loans and trade 
receivables.29   
The asset class ‘securities’ in Tables 7 and 8 would include mortgage-backed securities 
and thus could include the “toxic assets” that investors and the government recognized had issues 
with appropriate valuation.  In this setting, securities were likely high risk, while NR (non-rated) 
assets which include loans and trade receivables were likely lower risk.  Our analysis suggests 
that State Street was indifferent to the proportion of securities as the underlying asset class for 
 




the ABCP it purchased, while JP Morgan appears to be looking for deals with better quality 
assets except when they transacted with their own funds.      
4.4. Analysis of returns 
In this subsection, we examine the effect of participation in the AMLF on the stock 
returns of the various participants. Specifically, we regress the stock returns of the participants 
on a compound dummy variable representing the first seven days of the program and the CRSP 
equally weighted index.  The model is estimated between 1/1/2007 and 12/31/2010 using an 
autoregressive regression with GARCH effects. 
𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑀𝐿𝐹𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑗,𝑡𝜀𝑗,𝑡   (1) 
 




Rj,t = the return of stock j on day t. 
 
AMLF = a dummy variable with a value of 1 for each of the first seven days of the 
AMLF program (9/22/08 – 9/30/08) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Rm,t     = the return on CRSP value-weighted index on day t. 
 
The results from this regression are presented in Table 9.  We find that JP Morgan, State 
Street and Credit Suisse earned statistically (at the 5% level) significant returns of 2.28%, 2.49%, 
and 1.56%, respectively, over the first seven days of the AMLF program that cannot be 
explained by the market returns after controlling for the increased volatility (via incorporating 
GARCH effects into the equation). Because of the market disruptions during the event period, 
the AMLF dummy coefficients should be interpreted in a comparative framework, rather than 
relative to zero. JP Morgan, at 2.28%, is 42 basis points larger compared to next largest (BofA) 
AMLF parameter estimate while State Street, at 2.49%, is 63 basis points larger than BofA. We 
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also re-estimated the equation adding a variable to capture the unusual AMLF activity on May 5 
of 2009.  The May 5th dummy variable is not significant at generally accepted levels for any of 
the financial institutions.  As a robustness check, we re-estimate Equation (1) with a dependent 
variable of the daily returns on the financial services SPDR (Spider) index exchange-traded fund, 
XLF.  The AMLF dummy variable is not statistically significant and has an estimated coefficient 
of only 0.37%. 
Given the market capitalizations of State Street and JP Morgan, the returns from the 
government-sponsored AMLF provided significant capital/economic support to these firms.  
State Street’s capital grew (retained value) by about $0.5 billion across the first week of AMLF, 
while JP Morgan’s capital grew (retained value) by about $3.5 billion during the same period.  
Significant re-capitalization of the participating financial institutions in the middle of the 
financial crisis was not mentioned as a purpose of AMLF but could have been anticipated given 
the use of non-recourse loans and the opportunity to eliminate potential contingent cash flow 
liabilities arising from guarantees issued to support ABCP conduits. 
 
5. A comparison of the AMLF and the CPFF 
 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston developed AMLF over one weekend and began 
operations on Monday, September 22, 2008.  The program was to address concerns that forced 
sales of ABCP by MMFs would cause additional problems in that market.  AMLF operated 
through loans from the Federal Reserve to intermediary borrowers which were used in turn to 
purchase ABCP from MMFs.  This process was designed to overcome practical (legal) 
constraints in lending directly to MMFs.   
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CPFF (announced 10/7/08 and implemented 10/27/08) was designed to provide liquidity 
to CP issuers by purchasing ABCP and unsecured CP directly from issuers.  CPFF operated 
through a SPV created and funded by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  These two 
programs addressed similar issues one month apart in the crisis.  AMLF provided liquidity to 
MMFs that held ABCP and support to the market immediately following the Lehman bankruptcy 
by purchasing existing ABCP from the funds.  One month later, CPFF provided access to 
liquidity for CP issuers as investors (including the MMFs) remained reluctant to purchase CP.         
Table 10 shows weekly ABCP outstanding, as well as ABCP sold to AMLF and CPFF 
and ABCP holdings by the two facilities (in $ billion, at par, as of Wednesday of each week and 
Thursday through Wednesday for sales, to be consistent with the Fed reporting of weekly CP 
figures) from the end of August 2008 through early May 2009 (the last week with CP sales to the 
ALMF). First, we observe that the amount of ABCP outstanding (column 1) declined by almost 
20% throughout the period but there were no dramatic declines in the weeks immediately 
following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Second, AMLF was rarely used after the 
introduction of CPFF. Third, CPFF was used actively in the first two weeks, after which there 
are sharp increases in CP sales to the facility every three months as the old CP matures and new 
CP is sold to the CPFF (recall that the CPFF only purchased 90-day CP). 
Table 11 supplements Table 10 by providing the breakdown of weekly ABCP issuance 
by maturity ranges (Thursday through Wednesday). After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 
September 15, 2008, the shortest-term ABCP issuance increases dramatically and longer-term 
ABCP issuance volume falls, suggesting that investors (such as MMFs) were not willing to buy 
paper with maturities longer than just a few days even after the implementation of the AMLF, 
and issuers had to rely on rolling over the shortest term CP. After CPFF is implemented, 
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however, issuance of the shortest-term paper falls to the pre-Lehman bankruptcy levels and 
issuance of longer-term paper rises.  
Figure 2 plots the daily series of one-day and 90-day ABCP yields and holdings of ABCP 
by AMLF and CPFF. This complement to Tables 10 and 11 shows that placing the shortest-term 
ABCP right after the Lehman bankruptcy was much more costly. While the 90-day ABCP rate 
does not increase right after the Lehman’s fall, recall that issuance of longer-term ABCP 
declined dramatically following the event, indicating major difficulties for most issuers in 
placing term ABCP. The sharp increase in the 90-day ABCP yield coincides with the start of 
AMLF and is consistent with the unwillingness of MMFs to purchase term ABCP despite their 
ability to sell it to the facility. On the other hand, both one-day and 90-day ABCP rates declined 
after the start of CPFF. 
In sum, both programs provided liquidity to the ABCP market following the Lehman 
bankruptcy.   Specifically, AMLF provided liquidity to MMFs by purchasing highly illiquid 
ABCP which was at the center of the financial crisis, and CPFF followed by creating liquidity 
for CP issuers that had difficulty rolling their CP when it matured because investors were staying 
out of the market.  Because it took longer to set up CPFF, the AMLF can be viewed as an 
emergency program designed to offset the time needed to set up the SPV to facilitate the 
operation of CPFF and thus avoid the role of financial intermediaries as needed in AMLF.   The 
need for speed and the constraints under which the Fed operates resulted in a program that 
created riskless profits and self-dealing opportunities.  The design of the CPFF removed financial 
institutions as intermediaries in providing public liquidity support and thereby provided more 
market-wide support than the AMLF.  In this respect, compared to the AMLF, the CPFF is more 
consistent with Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet's (2004) prescription that the lender of last resort role 
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of central banks be more effective and focused on saving a market ("platform") rather than any 




The AMLF moved $217 billion of liquidity into MMFs through 3,249 purchases of asset-
backed commercial paper.  Duygan-Bump et al. (2012) find that AMLF was effective in its dual 
roles of (1) stabilizing MMF outflows and (2) improving ABCP market liquidity.  We agree and 
deepen the study of AMLF by examining what ABCP tended to be traded and who benefited 
from the trading. 
Our results suggest self-dealing by six of the seven institutions participating on the 
borrowing side of AMLF.  The one exception is State Street, which took a more market-wide 
approach to AMLF.  This self-dealing took a variety of forms.  First, the five institutions that 
participated in the program on a smaller scale purchased ABCP almost exclusively from related 
MMFs.  Second, borrowers that are also ABCP dealers had the majority of their transactions 
involve the ABCP for which they were the dealer.  Third, when JP Morgan was the only 
institution to buy ABCP, it tended to purchase paper backed by less risky assets, except when 
purchasing ABCP from its own funds, in which case it acquired paper backed by riskier assets.  
Further, when JP Morgan participated during the latter part of the AMLF program, the majority 
of these deals were with MMFs with which they had done earlier deals.  That is, JP Morgan 
continued to support MMFs with which it had already established relationships.   
 Through the use of non-recourse loans and absent the usual haircut involved when 
posting collateral, the seven institutions took no credit or market risk and tied up no capital in 
AMLF-related transactions.  As a result, the holdings obtained under this program by design had 
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a zero percent risk weight assessed for risk-based regulatory capital charge purposes.  In fact, the 
AMLF further reduced the risk of these institutions when dealing with ABCP for which they had 
provided guarantees; they were able to buy back the ABCP they previously guaranteed and 
transfer the risk to the Fed.  The AMLF also reduced the risk for the institutions that made the 
market in ABCP since a dealer stands ready to buy back any CP it has placed should the lender 
need to sell. This process would move the ABCP from the MMF to the dealer who would likely 
hold the ABCP on their balance sheet until maturity.  Given the non-recourse loans, the dealers 
could meet their market-making obligations without taking any additional risk. 
The design of AMLF allowed risk transfers and self-dealing.  The risk transfer was 
clearly part of the program design and a source of profits for the institutions. However, the 
program, initiated on an emergency basis, provided a major source of capital stability to the 
financial institutions that participated in a large number of deals. It is not obvious whether self-
dealing was anticipated and we have not seen a discussion of self-dealing under AMLF 
elsewhere.  Nonetheless, it is important that policy makers are aware of all the implications of 
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Sept 22, 2008 24,321 11.2 99 8.7 246 264 8.1 2.7 92 
Sept 23, 2008 31,113 14.3 120 10.6 259 328 10.1 2.7 95 
Sept 24, 2008 17,608 8.1 106 9.4 166 366 11.3 3.5 48 
Sept 25, 2008 22,387 10.3 117 10.3 191 419 12.9 3.6 53 
Sept 26, 2008 18,249 8.4 93 8.2 196 258 7.9 2.8 71 
Sept 29, 2008 25,239 11.6 114 10.1 221 325 10.0 2.9 78 
Sept 30, 2008 20,145 9.3 113 10.0 178 247 7.6 2.2 82 
Oct 1, 2008 2,489 1.1 31 2.7 80 42 1.3 1.4 59 
Oct 2, 2008 1,978 0.9 27 2.4 73 52 1.6 1.9 38 
Oct 3, 2008 1,679 0.8 21 1.9 80 42 1.3 2.0 40 
Oct 6, 2008 484 0.2 6 0.5 81 7 0.2 1.2 69 
Oct 7, 2008 943 0.4 17 1.5 55 27 0.8 1.6 35 
Oct 8, 2008 957 0.4 9 0.8 106 16 0.5 1.8 60 
Oct 9, 2008 434 0.2 14 1.2 31 17 0.5 1.2 26 
Oct 10, 2008 474 0.2 8 0.7 59 10 0.3 1.3 47 
Oct 14, 2008 647 0.3 7 0.6 92 17 0.5 2.4 38 
Oct 15, 2008 1,005 0.5 8 0.7 126 17 0.5 2.1 59 
Oct 16, 2008 191 0.1 4 0.4 48 6 0.2 1.5 32 
Oct 21, 2008 130 0.1 1 0.1 130 2 0.1 2.0 65 
Oct 22, 2008 32 0.0 1 0.1 32 3 0.1 3.0 11 
Oct 24, 2008 8 0.0 1 0.1 8 2 0.1 2.0 4 
Nov 4, 2008 20 0.0 1 0.1 20 1 0.0 1.0 20 
Nov 13, 2008 151 0.1 2 0.2 75 2 0.1 1.0 75 
Nov 21, 2008 2,965 1.4 16 1.4 185 58 1.8 3.6 51 
Nov 26, 2008 47 0.0 2 0.2 23 2 0.1 1.0 23 
Dec 1, 2008 328 0.2 3 0.3 109 6 0.2 2.0 55 
Dec 8, 2008 200 0.1 1 0.1 200 1 0.0 1.0 200 
Jan 6, 2009 200 0.1 1 0.1 200 3 0.1 3.0 67 
Jan 16, 2009 2,652 1.2 13 1.1 204 43 1.3 3.3 62 
Jan 22, 2009 100 0.0 1 0.1 100 2 0.1 2.0 50 
Jan 26, 2009 55 0.0 2 0.2 27 4 0.1 2.0 14 
Jan 27, 2009 807 0.4 6 0.5 135 9 0.3 1.5 90 
Jan 28, 2009 2,266 1.0 12 1.1 189 68 2.1 5.7 33 
Jan 29, 2009 1,321 0.6 10 0.9 132 23 0.7 2.3 57 
Jan 30, 2009 443 0.2 4 0.4 111 5 0.2 1.3 89 
Feb 3, 2009 50 0.0 1 0.1 50 1 0.0 1.0 50 
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Feb 4, 2009 727 0.3 3 0.3 242 12 0.4 4.0 61 
Feb 12, 2009 897 0.4 7 0.6 128 31 1.0 4.4 29 
Feb 23, 2009 95 0.0 1 0.1 95 4 0.1 4.0 24 
Feb 26, 2009 503 0.2 6 0.5 84 11 0.3 1.8 46 
Mar 5, 2009 292 0.1 8 0.7 36 20 0.6 2.5 15 
Mar 12, 2009 4,017 1.8 11 1.0 365 25 0.8 2.3 161 
Apr 24, 2009 3,109 1.4 9 0.8 345 40 1.2 4.4 78 
Apr 30, 2009 100 0.0 1 0.1 100 1 0.0 1.0 100 
May 5, 2009 23,149 10.7 63 5.6 367 362 11.1 5.7 64 
May 6, 2009 2,223 1.0 29 2.6 77 46 1.4 1.6 48 
May 7, 2009 0 0.0 1 0.1 0 1 0.0 1.0 0 
May 8, 2009 28 0.0 1 0.1 28 1 0.0 1.0 28 
Total or Average 217,258 100.0 1,132 100.0 127 3,249 100.0 2.3 56 
 


















































JP Morgan Chase 111,320 51.2 569 50.3 196 1,882 58 3.3 59.1 102.0 50.6 2.28 
State Street  89,241 41.1 437 38.6 204 1,149 35 2.6 77.7 72.6 41.2 2.86 
Bank of NY Mellon 12,924 5.9 58 5.1 223 135 4 2.3 95.7 20.6 76 2.92 
Bank of America 1,557 0.7 19 1.7 82 22 1 1.2 70.8 2.1 44.9 3.27 
Citigroup  1,437 0.7 40 3.5 36 52 2 1.3 27.6 2.5 67.9 2.46 
Suntrust  540 0.2 7 0.6 77 7 0 1.0 77.2 2.9 67.3 4.83 
Credit Suisse  238 0.1 2 0.2 119 2 0 1.0 119.2 0.4 102.5 2.30 
Total or Average 217,258 100.0 1,132 100.0 192 3,249 100 2.9 66.9    
 
Notes: 
Profit = par of CP bought –amortized cost of CP bought – AMLF loans interest based on a 360-day year; 
WAM is weighted average maturity of CP acquired by an institution (weights based on par value of CP); 
WA yield is weighted average discount yield computed as (total par of CP bought – total amortized cost of CP bought)*(360/WAM) 
 
 








Table 3.Largest sellers of ABCP through the AMLF program 
 
 
Based on data obtained from: (http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/amlf.xls) 
 
 



















Reserve  Primary Fund 108 19,299 8.9 8.9 
JPMorgan Prime Money Market Fund 98 15,559 7.2 16.1 
Money Market Master Portfolio / Barclays Global Investors Funds 50 9,273 4.3 20.3 
Blackrock Liquidity Tempfund 61 9,127 4.2 24.5 
Columbia Cash Reserves 46 8,588 4.0 28.5 
Liquid Assets Portfolio / Short Term Investments Trust 87 8,272 3.8 32.3 
Prime Portfolio / Morgan Stanley Institutional Liquidity Funds 48 6,674 3.1 35.4 
Federated Prime Obligations Fund  88 6,542 3.0 38.4 
Columbia Money Market Reserves  47 6,141 2.8 41.2 
Financial Square Prime Obligations Fund / Goldman Sachs Trust 30 5,570 2.6 43.8 
Dreyfus International Cash Advantage Fund 28 5,318 2.5 46.2 
DWS Money Market Series 48 4,705 2.2 48.4 
Cash Investment Money Market Fund / Wells Fargo Funds Trust 75 4,358 2.0 50.4 
32 
 
Table 4. AMLF Transactions by Fund 
All funds that sell $1 billion or more in AMLF program, plus all funds from the same family that also participated in AMLF, plus 
Oppenheimer and Schwab funds for name recognition 
Panel A. Funds from which both JP Morgan Chase and State Street purchased ABCP 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
AIM 
           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 





















































































           
Treesource Industries 

















































           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 







































































































































Panel A. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
DWS 
           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
 









































































           































































           
The Northern Trust Company 















































































Panel A. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
Merrill Lynch 
           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
 





















































































           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
 
 




































T. Rowe Price 
           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 




































































Panel A. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
UBS 
           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
Investors Fiduciary Trust 
 




























































































































Panel B. Funds for which either JP Morgan Chase or State Street dominated the ABCP purchases 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
Charles Schwab 
           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 





















































































           


















































































































































































































Panel B. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
Columbia 
           































































           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
 

















































           
The Bank of New York Mellon 










































































































































Panel B. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
JPMorgan 
           













































           
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
 





































           
Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. 

























           
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 





























































































































Panel B. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
Mount Vernon 
           
U.S. Bank 
 

























































































           


























           
U.S. Bank National 
Association 
 

















































           
Wells Fargo Bank 
 






















BofA (1), Citi (3) 
 






























Panel B. Continued 
Fund Name  $ mil.  #  JP  SS  Other  Custodian 
WellsFargo 
           
Wells Fargo Bank 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
 










































































































Table 5. Summary Statistics of the AMFL Purchases by Borrower 
         
  Par value (in $mil.)  Number of purchases 
Borrower  Role=0  Role=1  Role=0  Role=1 
JP Morgan Chase  99,445.15  12,233.75  1624  258 
State Street  84,645.49  4,889.41  1098  51 
Bank of New York Mellon  12,786.02  69.00  132  3 
Bank of America  586.35  977.23  12  10 
Citi  773.11  670.45  28  24 
Suntrust  145.11  400.00  5  2 
Credit Suisse  240.00  0.00  2  0 
Total  198,621.22  19,239.84  2,901  348 
The table reports the total number and par value of the ABCP purchases by Borrower. 
Role=1 indicates that the borrower has a relation with the ABCP program in the form of 
being the administrator, liquidity provider, credit enhancement provider, or a combination of 
the three roles. Role=0 indicates no such relationship exists. 
         
Table 6. Percentage of ABCP purchased by Borrower by Dealer 
  Dealer 
Borrower  BofA  Citi  CS  JPMC  SST 
JP Morgan Chase  31.81%  74.49%  30.01%  56.07%  0.00% 
State Street  25.78%  69.47%  23.56%  63.39%  0.00% 
Bank of New York Mellon  9.12%  97.18%  42.81%  53.49%  0.00% 
Bank of America  78.21%  29.12%  13.93%  42.15%  0.00% 
Citi  35.84%  89.06%  18.51%  58.44%  0.00% 
Suntrust  14.70%  100.00%  88.08%  14.70%  0.00% 
Credit Suisse  0.00%  58.33%  58.33%  0.00%  0.00% 
The table reports the dealer information in percentage terms of the ABCP 
purchased by borrower. The coding on dealers is as follows: BofA (Bank of 
America), Citi (Citibank), CS (Credit Suisse), JPMC (JP Morgan Chase) and 
SST (State Street). 
 
 





Table 7. Average Rating Composition of the ABCP Conduits Sold by Funds 
      Top Three Rating Categories 
Fund Family Name  NR  Securities  R1  R2  R3 
Panel A:  Split Deals between JP Morgan and State Street 
AIM  21%  41%  Baa2 (4%)  Aaa (4%)  Aa3 (4%) 
Barclays  33%  22%  Aaa (8%)  A3 (5%)  Baa2 (4%) 
BlackRock  34%  18%  Aaa (6%)  A3 (6%)  Aa1 (6%) 
DWS  20%  10%  Aa3 (7%)  Aaa (7%)  B2 (6%) 
Federated  31%  2%  Aaa (10%)  A3 (7%)  A2 (6%) 
Goldman Sachs  43%  1%  A3 (7%)  Aa1 (6%)  Aaa (5%) 
Merrill Lynch  31%  22%  Aaa (7%)  A3 (6%)  Baa1 (5%) 
Reserve  8%  55%  Aa2 (21%)  Aa3 (1%)  B1 (1%) 
T. Rowe Price  33%  11%  Aa1 (7%)  A3 (7%)  Aaa (6%) 
UBS  32%  2%  A3 (7%)  Aaa (7%)  Aa3 (7%) 
Panel B:  Deals not Split between JP Morgan and State Street (italics are State Street deals) 
Columbia  31%  46%  A3 (4%)  Aa1 (3%)  Baa1 (3%) 
Evergreen  32%  2%  Aaa (7%)  Baa2 (7%)  B1 (7%) 
Russell Investment  17%  28%  A3 (8%)  A1 (8%)  A2 (7%) 
Schwab  27%  14%  B3 (8%)  B1 (5%)  Aa3 (4%) 
SEI  29%  56%  Aa1 (3%)  A3 (2%)  Baa1 (2%) 
Dreyfus  37%  14%  A3 (8%)  Aa1 (6%)  A2 (3%) 
Fidelity  50%  4%  B3 (8%)  Baa2 (5%)  B1 (4%) 
Janus  42%  13%  B1 (10%)  A2 (4%)  Aaa (4%) 
JPMorgan  32%  20%  A3 (7%)  Aa1 (6%)  Baa2 (5%) 
Marshall  44%  1%  A3 (9%)  Baa1 (5%)  Aa1 (5%) 
Morgan Stanley  29%  30%  Baa2 (5%)  A3 (4%)  Aa3(4%) 
Mount Vernon  41%  3%  Aaa (7%)  B2 (7%)  Aa3 (6%) 
Oppenheimer  43%  9%  Baa2 (8%)  Aa2 (5%)  A3 (5%) 
Tamarack  31%  3%  Aaa (9%)  Aa3 (7%)  A3 (6%) 
WellsFargo  44%  15%  A3 (6%)  A1 (5%)  Aa1 (5%) 




Table 8. Top Three Asset Classes in ABCP Conduits Sold by Funds  
Fund Family Name  Top Three Asset Classes 
Panel A:  Split Deals between JP Morgan and State Street 
AIM  Securities (41%) Trade receivables (11%) Credit card receivables (10%) 
Barclays  Securities (22%) Credit card receivables (14%) Trade receivables 
BlackRock  Securities (18%) Student loans Student loans (11%) 
DWS  Credit card receivables (18%) Auto loans (14%) Trade receivables (12%) 
Federated  Credit card receivables (18%) Commercial loans (13%) Auto loans (12%) 
Goldman Sachs  Commercial loans (23%) Student loans (18%) Government guaranteed loans (13%) 
Merrill Lynch  Securities (21%) Commercial loans (14%) Student loans (14%) 
Reserve  Securities (55%) Commercial mortgage loans (12%) Cbo & Clo (8%) 
T. Rowe Price  Student loans (21%) Commercial loans (15%) Credit cards receivables (14%) 
UBS  Credit card receivables (21%) Auto loans (14%) Trade receivables (14%) 
Panel B:  Deals not Split between JP Morgan and State Street (italics are State Street deals)  
Columbia  Securities (46%) Student loans (12%) Commercial loans (11%) 
Evergreen  Trade receivables (21%) Commercial loans (19%) Credit cards receivables (15%) 
Russell Investment  Trade receivables (30%) Securities (28%) Credit card receivables (14%) 
Schwab  Commercial loans (39%) Auto loans (18%) Securities (14%) 
SEI  Securities (55%) Commercial loans (9%) Student loans (8%) 
Dreyfus  Commercial loans (23%) Student loans (20%) Securities (14%) 
Fidelity  Auto loans (21%) Commercial loans (16%) Trade receivables (15%) 
Janus  Trade receivables (24%) Auto loans (14%) Securities (13%) 
JPMorgan  Commercial loans (17%) Securities (20%) Student loans (27%) 
Marshall  Commercial loans (30%) Student loans (18%) Trade receivables (11%) 
Morgan Stanley  Securities (30%) Commercial loans (13%) Credit card receivables (11%) 
Mount Vernon  Credit cards receivables (21%) Trade receivables (13%) Auto loans (12%) 
Oppenheimer  Government guaranteed loans (31%) Credit card receivables (14%) Trade receivables (9%) 
Tamarack  Credit card receivables (16%) Auto loans (16%) Commercial loans (14%) 
WellsFargo  Commercial loans (17%) Student loans (15%) Securities (15%) 




Table 9: Estimation of the Returns to Financial Institutions Participating in the AMLF Program 
 
Auto-regression (with GARCH effects) of the returns of financial institutions participating in AMLF on a 
compound dummy (0/1) for the first seven days of the programs availability (9/22/08 through 9/30/08), 
and the CRSP value-weighted market index adjusted for dividends and stock splits over the period 1/1/07 
through 12/31/10.  AMLF equals 1 for the first seven days of the AMLF program and zero otherwise. 
Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
 
𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑀𝐿𝐹𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑗,𝑡𝜀𝑗,𝑡 























*Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level 
 
  













































































$bln, at par 
ABCP sales 
to AMLF, 
$bln, at par 
AMLF 
holdings, 
$bln, at par 
ABCP sales to 
CPFF, $bln, at 
par 
CPFF holdings 
of ABCP, $bln, 
at par 
8/27/08 745.6 -- -- -- -- 
9/3/08 742.1 -- -- -- -- 
9/10/08 740.9 -- -- -- -- 
9/17/08 708.3 -- -- -- -- 
9/24/08 711.7 73.3  72.7 -- -- 
10/1/08 694.0 88.9  152.1 -- -- 
10/8/08 675.8 6.1  139.5 -- -- 
10/15/08 675.9 2.6  122.8 -- -- 
10/22/08 668.2 0.4  107.9 -- -- 
10/29/08 701.0 0.0  96.0 50.3 50.3 
11/5/08 711.9 0.0  85.1 25.0 75.3 
11/12/08 718.3 0.0  76.5 4.1 79.4 
11/19/08 699.5 0.2  61.9 5.5 84.9 
11/26/08 697.8 3.0  53.3 10.5 95.5 
12/3/08 692.5 0.3  49.2 0.6 96.0 
12/10/08 698.9 0.2  34.4 6.8 102.8 
12/17/08 710.5 0.0  27.4 4.6 107.3 
12/24/08 703.0 0.0  24.0 12.3 119.7 
12/31/08 703.7 0.0  23.8 1.7 121.4 
1/7/09 698.8 0.2  21.1 0.1 121.5 
1/14/09 693.0 0.0  16.1 0.0 121.5 
1/21/09 676.4 2.7  14.8 2.6 124.1 
1/28/09 668.7 3.2  16.0 45.3 107.6 
2/4/09 670.0 2.5  16.9 16.8 110.6 
2/11/09 663.0 0.0  14.2 6.2 111.6 
2/18/09 648.2 0.9  12.7 7.3 111.3 
2/25/09 646.3 0.1  10.0 7.8 112.0 
3/4/09 643.2 0.5  8.1 3.5 115.0 
3/11/09 634.7 0.3  6.8 5.7 113.5 
3/18/09 625.6 4.0  7.6 6.5 113.0 
3/25/09 627.8 0.0  6.8 8.4 111.9 
4/1/09 634.8 0.0  6.1 8.8 119.0 
4/8/09 632.5 0.0  3.7 0.4 119.3 
4/15/09 621.4 0.0  2.0 2.0 119.4 
4/22/09 615.4 0.0  0.8 1.6 120.2 
4/29/09 604.6 3.1  3.7 32.5 100.5 
5/6/09 603.3 25.5  29.0 12.4 102.8 
 




Table 11. Weekly issuance of ABCP, Thursday through Wednesday, $ billion. 
 
 Maturity, days 
 Date 1-4 5-9 10-20 21-40  41-80   > 80 
8/27/08 173.9 15.8 11.4 31.4 13.2 19.3 
9/3/08 124.3 13.1 10.2 24.4 9.8 11.6 
9/10/08 139.2 15.3 10.9 39.6 14.1 31.1 
9/17/08 209.3 7.7 9.6 24.9 4.8 9.8 
9/24/08 446.2 19.6 9.7 15.8 2.8 4.3 
10/1/08 481.6 23.8 13.8 22.8 9.6 9.6 
10/8/08 414.5 21.1 22.1 28.3 8.8 14.5 
10/15/08 365.2 24.9 18.4 41.4 11.6 15.4 
10/22/08 340.2 19.3 14.3 44.0 15.7 22.7 
10/29/08 302.7 16.7 10.9 30.3 4.5 56.9 
11/5/08 235.5 12.2 8.1 25.6 11.6 44.5 
11/12/08 172.5 14.4 5.4 18.1 9.2 19.1 
11/19/08 221.5 15.0 7.3 31.0 24.7 29.3 
11/26/08 203.8 32.4 12.8 15.7 18.1 25.2 
12/3/08 139.1 16.9 4.4 13.6 15.2 6.4 
12/10/08 182.5 18.5 8.2 32.3 14.5 21.9 
12/17/08 162.3 16.6 1.1 28.6 6.9 12.8 
12/24/08 145.3 27.6 14.6 20.4 5.0 6.9 
12/31/08 85.5 18.9 2.2 9.0 1.2 2.4 
1/7/09 100.8 16.1 5.1 21.8 5.2 11.3 
1/14/09 125.4 15.4 5.2 33.8 9.8 19.9 
1/21/09 103.4 16.1 7.2 27.4 10.9 10.9 
1/28/09 130.6 15.0 12.5 33.0 9.2 37.0 
2/4/09 122.8 18.3 7.5 19.2 8.6 13.1 
2/11/09 122.1 19.0 5.1 38.8 8.5 15.4 
2/18/09 94.5 19.8 6.2 33.9 10.0 12.0 
2/25/09 107.2 18.4 4.4 29.4 11.1 10.5 
3/4/09 105.0 17.3 5.8 25.4 6.8 9.6 
3/11/09 96.8 15.9 4.5 33.1 12.1 12.8 
3/18/09 99.0 16.9 5.2 37.5 10.8 9.1 
3/25/09 100.6 16.4 3.5 31.9 7.5 8.2 
4/1/09 97.7 16.3 2.9 18.4 6.3 10.2 
4/8/09 88.7 17.7 6.5 30.0 8.1 16.9 
4/15/09 77.3 21.1 5.9 28.2 7.4 16.3 
4/22/09 101.2 19.5 7.0 32.1 8.0 15.6 
4/29/09 126.9 15.6 7.6 25.9 7.8 39.3 
5/6/09 110.4 17.6 6.6 17.9 7.7 20.4 





Amounts of Commercial Paper Outstanding January 2004 – September 2010  
 




























































































































Note: ABCP holdings of the AMLF and the CPFF are at par, in $ billion. Daily holdings were computed 
as the ABCP purchased by a given facility up to date minus ABCP purchased by the facility that has 





































ABCP 1d ABCP 90d CPFF hldgs AMLF hldgs
Lehman bankruptcy
